As promised, I'm writing a bit more about the history of internet (in)security. This week is part 1, covering the basics of early computer security and what that meant before interconnected networks. Part 2 will look at how design choices for Arpanet and later protocols shaped internet insecurity.
Thinking
Computer security started out as a locksmithing problem. Early commercial computers were very expensive and the organizations that built or leased or purchased them needed to protect that investment, so those computers were housed in specialized secure rooms. IBM engineer Walter Tuchman described security in the early days of mainframe computing as "locked desk drawers, locked doors on computer rooms, and loyal well-behaved employees, the latter probably being the weakest link." Computer security sometimes got caught up in college protests in the 1960s and 1970s, when the military-sponsored machines were the target of antiwar and anti-government protests.
Once universities debuted time-sharing networks, where small workstations were networked into a central mainframe, the question of access became more complicated. How could time-sharing computer administrators reproduce their physical access controls within a networked system? Time-sharing systems had one security advantage over our modern idea of networks: they were closed networks. Before the development of the inter-network protocols that underpin today's internet, a time-sharing network was an island, unconnected to similar networks at other universities or institutions. Each time-sharing network was centralized on one or more computers, and access to those centralized resources could only be done by way of one of the terminals that comprised the network.